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APPELLANT REGANS' REPLY BRIEF ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 35(g), Regan herewith supplies this Court with Exhibits 
A, B, C, and D to this Reply Brief labeled to identify the physical location of the real property 
discussed herein and other matters. Also, citations appearing in indented paragraphs are 
superfluous, thus are omitted from the Table of Cases and Authorities above. 
1) Whether the trial court erred in not considering Idaho Code section 55-603 
when it ruled to dismiss Regans' prescriptive easement claim with prejudice. 
Respondents Owen would like this Court to don blinders and agree that the District Court 
should ignore all law that the attorneys do not bring before it, and thus that Idaho Code section 63-
1009 should be the only law the District Court or this Court considers, when Owen claims Idaho 
Code section 55-603 should be ignored in this case. Resp. Br. at 29. Even if a District Court as a 
matter of judicial policy is advised to wear blinders to Idaho law obviously applicable in a case, 
certainly this Court should not advocate or follow such practice. "Appellate judges should defer to 
findings of fact based upon substantial evidence, but they ought to review freely the conclusions 
of law reached by stating legal rules or principles and applying them to the facts found." Staggie 
v. Idaho Falls Consol. Hospitals, Inc., 110 Idaho 349, 351, 715 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Ct.App.1986); 
see, e.g., City of Burley v. McCaslin Lumber Co., 107 Idaho 906,693 P.2d 1108 (Ct.App.1984); 
Posey v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 141 Idaho 477, 480, 111 P.3d 162, 165 (Ct.App.2005) ("The 
analysis of the parties and the district court was flawed, however, because the common law rule is 
not applicable here. Rather, the lease transaction was subject to [ ] the Uniform Commercial 
Code"). Here, similarly, Idaho Code section 55-603 should not be ignored. 
In addition to ignoring the law of easements in Idaho Code section 55-603, Owen claims 
"I[daho] C[ode section] 63-1009 controls over I[daho] C[ode section] 55-603 because it is a more 
specific and recent statute." Resp. Br. at 30. While true that Idaho Code section 63-1009 was first 
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enacted in 1996, that date only presents itself as the purported date of enactment if one ignores all 
of its earlier iterations in the statutes as cited in the cases. Smith v. City of Nampa, 57 Idaho 736, 
68 P.2d 344 (1937)(citing LC.§ 61-1032 dated 1932); Andrews v. North Side Canal Co., 52 Idaho 
117, 12 P.2d 263 (1932) (citing C.S. § 3263 dated 1921, and C.S. § 3423 dated 1929). 
Finally, Owens reach their core contention on this issue in the second paragraph at the 
bottom of its Brief on page 30: the "long-standing and foundational rule of statutory construction 
that when two statutes conflict, the more specific [Idaho Code section 63-1009] controls over the 
more general [Idaho Code section 55-603] statute." Resp. Br. at 30. Owens claims Idaho Code 
section 63-1009 "created a specific exemption to the general rule in Idaho Code section 55-603." 
Owens Br. at 31. However, the Title 63 statute does not create the specific exemption in its plain 
language, but can only be interpreted as being more specific if it utilizes the dicta from the 1929 
case of Hunt v. Bremer expanding the definition of an encumbrance. Id. at 31; see Hunt v. Bremer, 
47 Idaho 490,276 P. 964 (1929). Without the dicta, Idaho Code section 63-1009 makes no specific 
exception. 
Interestingly, Owen claims Idaho Code section 63-1009 "simply created an exception to 
the general rule" of Idaho Code section 55-603, however what Owen really means to say is that 
the tax deed statute completely eradicates the effect of Idaho Code section 55-603 when a tax 
collector issues a deed. Owen provides no answers -- in fact, does not even address the question 
why a delinquent taxpayer would have included in their seized property a vested real property 
interest that rightfully belongs to a dominant estate next door when the seized land is deeded to 
the county for back taxes. Owen argues that the legislature enacted Idaho Code section 63-1009 to 
give a County free reign to unconstitutionally take vested property rights belonging to third parties, 
and Owen argues this without qualms -- or answers about the clear and unmistakable constitutional 
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violation Owens' interpretation requires. "An exception to the general rule" indeed. Owens Br. at 
32. 
Regan disagrees the legislature has any such power to violate constitutional rights. 
2) Whether the trial court erred in assuming the Tax Deed for the orphan parcel 
was valid, even though the Tax Deed did not meet the legal description requirements for tax 
deeds under Idaho Code section 63-1006{6){c). 
The District Court committed a fundamental error when it assumed the tax deed for the 
orphan parcel was valid. Owen claims validity of the deed was never challenged, and thus this 
Court "should not consider the issue on appeal." Owen Br. at 32. However, this Court has the 
power to reverse fundamental error under certain conditions met here: 
Idaho decisional law, however, has long allowed appellate courts to 
consider a claim of error to which no objection was made below if the issue 
presented rises to the level of fundamental error. See State v. Field, 144 
Idaho 559,571, 165 P.3d 273,285 (2007); State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 
251,486 P.2d 260, 262 (1971). In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 
961 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court abandoned the definitions it had 
previously utilized to describe what may constitute fundamental error. The 
Perry Court held that an appellate court should reverse an unobjected-to 
error when the defendant persuades the court that the alleged error: (1) 
violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) 
is clear or obvious without the need for reference to any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record; and (3) affected the 
outcome of the trial proceedings. Id. at 226,245 P.3d at 978. 
State v. Neyhart, No. 42923 (Ct.App. Jun. 8, 2016). 
In this case, addressing the first Neyhart element, the fundamental error of the District 
Court was in assuming the validity of the tax deed when it determined Regan's vested easement 
right could be taken by that tax deed, which was a violation of Reagan's unwaived constitutional 
right to due process pursuant to the Fifth and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and his 
constitutional right to enjoy just compensation for the taking pursuant to the Fifth A~mendment of 
the U.S. Constitution. U.S. Const. Am. V; XIV. 
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Addressing the second Neyhart element, a simple reading of the legal description in the tax 
deed shows that it violates the stated requirements ofldaho Code section 63-1006(6)(c) without 
the need for reference to any additional information whatsoever. A.R. 622-623. 
Finally, addressing the third Neyhart element, this fundamental error of the District Court 
in assuming the validity of the tax deed affected the outcome of the trial proceedings, because if 
the deed is invalid, then it would be void and Regan's easement would not be unconstitutionally 
taken by it. Even though Neyhart is a criminal case, and this is a civil case, Regan finds no citation 
to authority showing a hierarchy of constitutional rights mandates a civil constitutional right is or 
should be less fundamental to liberty in the eyes of this Court than a criminal constitutional right. 
Regan believes a constitutional right is a constitutional right. When a court below makes 
an assumption which fundamental error results in the unconstitutional destruction of a vested right 
to real property, then this Court not only has the power to reverse it, but should do so. 
Owen then argues that the tax deed at issue shows the "tax assessor's number immediately 
below the Exhibit "A," and identifies it as Parcel Number 50N03W-27-7160." Owens Br. at 32. 
This is not true. The tax deed states, "Bill #220140," which is not a tax number. A.R. at 623 (Ex. 
B. to Weeks' Aff. in Supp. OfDef's. 2nd Mot. for Summ. J.). 
Instead of focusing on the actual requirements ofldaho Code section 63-1006(6)(c), Owens 
cite to earlier case law that does not involve that statute - notably pre-1996 case law. Owens Br. at 
33; citingMeneice v. The Blackstone Mining Co., Ltd., 22 Idaho 451, 120 P.2d 450 (1942); Kelson 
v. Drainage Dist. No. 10 of Boundary Co., 77 Idaho 320,291 P.2d 867,869 (1955). The pre-1996 
cases do not address the tax deed statute at issue here and should be ignored by the Court. The 
reason the }.1eneice and Kelson cases do not apply is because they were pre-1996, when Idaho code 
section 63-1006( 6)( c) was passed requiring new specificity to legal descriptions used in tax deeds. 
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In the Meneice case, this Court stated: 
It should be further remembered that the acquisition of a tax title by the 
county or state is a purely ex parte, unilateral proceeding in rem and requires 
more particularity of description than is required in a contract for sale or 
deed or other bilateral contract or agreement. Wilson v. Jarron, 23 Idaho 
563, 568, 131 P. 12; Norrie v. Fleming, supra; Miller v. Williams, 135 Cal. 
183, 67 P. 788; Mallman v. Kneeben, 11 Cal.App.2d 484, 54 P.2d 46, 47. 
This court has consistently held, through a series of opinions, that a valid 
tax title may not be based on an assessment and tax deed containing an 
insufficient description to enable one to examine the record and there to 
acquire sufficient data to enable him to locate the land taxed. Booth v. 
Cooper, 22 Idaho 451, 126 P. 776; Wilson v. Jarron, supra; Cahoon v. 
Seger, 31 Idaho 101, 111, 168 P. 441; Dickerson v. Hansen, 32 Idaho 18, 
22, 177 P. 760; Hedrick v. Lee, supra; Western Loan & Bldg. Co. v. Bandel, 
57 Idaho 101, 63 P.2d 159; Stickel v. Carter, 63 Idaho 78, 117 P.2d 477; see 
also Burton v. Hoover, 93 Utah 498, 74 P.2d 652; Van Cise v. Carter, 9 S.D. 
234, 68 N.W. 539; Grand Forks County v. Fredericks, 16 N.D. 118, 112 
N.W. 839.) 
Meneice v. The Blackstone Mining Company, Ltd, 63 Idaho 413, 417-18, 121 P.2d 450, 454-55 
(1942). In 1942, a person could "examine the record and there [ ] acquire sufficient data to enable 
him to locate the land taxed." 
However, today the statutes require more specificity: "[a]n accurate description of the 
property using a township, range, section and division of section, together with a statement as to 
acreage, or in the appropriate case, using block and lot numbers or as described in a city plat; and 
if appropriate, include the tax number." LC. § 63-1006( 6)( c ). The Owen Tax Deed includes none 
of those descriptors. A.R. 624-25. 
Owens' cited Kelson case gave the result Regan prays this Court finds here, which is that 
the case be "remanded with directions to the trial court to enter conclusions and decree holding the 
county's assessment and notice voidable for insufficient description, and that the county acquired 
no title to the property by reason thereof, and enjoining any tax sale based thereon." Kelson v. 
Drainage Dist. No. 10 Boundary Co., 77 Idaho 320, 325, 291 P.2d 867, 872 (1955); see Cahoon 
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v. Seger, 31 Idaho 101, 168 P. 441 (1917) ("the tax deed in question operated to convey no title 
whatever.") Because the Owen tax deed does not comply with Idaho Code section 63-1006(6)(c) 
in any respect, this Court should find the earlier cases do not apply, because the statute today 
requires specificity not required in those earlier cases. 
3) Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Regans' prescriptive easement 
claim, because appellants were denied due process by the Kootenai County Board of 
Commissioners when it did not provide Regans notice of the pending issuance of the Tax 
Deed for the orphan parcel. 
Next, Owens brief tries to persuade this Court to jettison Regan's rights to due process, 
because it was only raised in "a statement made in passing." Owens Br. at 33. In doing so, Owen 
hopes this Court will let the District Court off the hook for blatantly ignoring evidence in the 
pleadings of a violation of Regan's constitutional due process rights. In addition, Owens would 
like this Court to sweep the issue aside in this appeal, as if constitutional rights to due process 
should not be rigorously ferreted out and upheld by this Court. Owens arguments are frivolous. 
Owens then tries to persuade this Court that Regan's must prove a negative, where 
Reagan's "provide this court with no citation to evidence in the record to support their claim they 
did not receive notice of the tax sale." Id. 
In the Wylie case, this Court noted it held previously that: 
... notice by publication is sufficient only where an interested party is not 
'reasonably identifiable;' for example, where a person is missing or 
unknown, or after a reasonable and diligent search, no address could be 
found for a missing person. Giacobbi v. Hall, l 09 Idaho 293,297, 707 P.2d 
404, 408 (1985), relying on Mennonite and Mullane v. Central Hanover 
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed.2d 865 (1950). The 
import of the decisions in Mennonite and Giacobbi is that where the 
interested party is reasonably identifiable, such as through a publicly 
recorded instrument, notice solely by publication is not sufficient to meet 
due process requirements. 
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Wylie v. Patton, 111 Idaho 61, 66, 720 P.2d 649, 654 (Ct.App.1986); citing Giacobbi v. Hall, 109 
Idaho 293,297, 707 P.2d 404,408 (1985). 
In this case, even though the legal description was insufficient to make the tax deed 
conveyance valid pursuant to Idaho Code section 63-1006( 6)( c ), Kootenai County could have used 
the grantees' address information in the deeds referenced in it to give notice to surrounding 
landowners of the pending tax sale. Kootenai County did not make that effort, and its publication 
was insufficient to give Regan notice of the tax sale. 
4) Whether the trial court erred when it determined the definition of "absolute 
title" to the servient estate orphan parcel did not include such servient status for Regans' 
dominant estate appurtenant and vested rights to the prescriptive easement claimed but 
unadiudicated by that court. 
Owen argues that "absolute title is synonymous and Idaho case law with fee simple or fee 
simple absolute title in real property." Owens Br. at 21. However, Owens leave unaddressed the 
issue of why upon a tax deed foreclosure the county would enjoy greater rights than a common 
lender like Bank of America or Wells Fargo when foreclosing the real property held as security 
for its debt. If absolute title is synonymous with fee simple title, then a private conveyance of fee 
simple title that leaves third-party vested easement rights in those third parties should be 
synonymous with the result of a tax deed where a fee simple title is taken from the delinquent 
taxpayer to secure taxes then due. Owen does not discuss the difference. There is none. 
After that, Owens unreasonably attempts to argue that the District Court's use of dicta from 
the 1929 Hunt case should make this Court's interpretation ofidaho Code section 67-1009 clear. 
In short, that the 1929 open-ended definition of an encumbrance is the proper way to interpret an 
allegedly unambiguous statue that Owens earlier argues was only passed in 1996! Owens 
accomplishes this leap of logic using an entire page to argue Idaho Code section 63-1009 is 
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unambiguous, which means the language on its face requires no further interpretation. Owens Br. 
at 25. However, if the language is unambiguous, why retreat to 80-year-old case law? 
However, and more importantly, Owens completely leaves unaddressed the issue of why 
the conveyance of absolute title in the tax deed, which title is purported to be synonymous with 
fee simple title gave Kootenai County the ability to seize more property than the delinquent 
taxpayer actually owned. Owen argues a tax deed carries the power to take property the delinquent 
taxpayer does not own, to wit, the vested easement rights of Regan. Owens Br. at 22. This Court 
should not approve such instability in the law, unless it wants to sit as a legislature and craft notice 
provisions so that every dominant easement owner in Idaho gets notice of the pending issuance of 
tax deeds. Such an absurd violation of the separation of powers is a path to avoid. 
Owen's case turns frivolous when that respondent states when interpreting Idaho Code 
section 63-1009 this "Court must give effect to unambiguous statutory language without further 
engaging in statutory construction." Owens Br. at 25. If that statute was unambiguous regarding 
the definition of the term "encumbrance," why would this Court have to reach back to 1929 and 
use dicta to give its 2014 guidance to the District Court? Regan v. Jeff D., 339 P.3d 1162, 1169 
(2014). The statute is certainly ambiguous when the Court has to refer to case law over 80 years 
old and finds no constitutional violation in the taking resulting from its guidance. Certainly there 
is ambiguous statutory language in Idaho Code section 63-1009, and Owens is arguing frivolously 
in stating there is not. Owens Br. at 25. 
Finally, and unargued previously, the 1929 Hunt case was an "action to foreclose [a 
voluntary, private party] contract for sale of real estate." Hunt v. Bremer, 47 Idaho 490,491,276 
P. 964, 965 (1929). It was a case regarding the covenant against encumbrances in that voluntary 
private contract, wherein the vendor promised to provide "a good and sufficient deed with title 
free and clear of encumbrances." Hunt, 47 Idaho at 492,276 P. at 966. Owen does not account for 
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differences between a voluntary, private party contract and an involuntary public party tax deed 
seizure. This Court should find the 1929 Hunt case and its dicta inapplicable to a tax deed seizure. 
5) Whether the trial court erred in not determining whether Owens' December 
17, 2010 combining of their two parcels effectively served as a relocation by that servient 
estate owner of the existing northern thirty-foot wide easement roadway pursuant to Idaho 
Code section 55-313. 
Owen's response brief conflates the reformation of the Owens deed, which was properly 
overturned by this Court, with the argument presented by Regan. Owens Br. at 39. Regan's 
argument is that when Owen consolidated his parcels in 2010, that he moved the location of the 
express 30-foot easement physically on the ground, by moving the northern boundary of his deed 
with the consolidation. See attached Reply Brief Ex. B. This issue was raised in the Supplemental 
Affidavit of Scott Poorman in Support of Regan's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Contempt 
filed December 7, 2011. A.R. pp. 269-274, 1 5, Ex. F; see attached Reply Brief Ex. C. Mr. 
Poorman's Exhibit F shows the "Z" indicating a consolidated parcel at the very top of that Exhibit, 
where Owens' square parcel designated tax number 14159 on its northern border shows the 
consolidation. Id. The Segregation Revisions on the left side of that Exhibit F map show that on 
December 17, 2010 the orphan parcel number "50N03W-27-7160 was combined with [Owens' 
main] parcel number 50N03W-34-3600." Id. 
Regan's argument here is that because he enjoys a 30-foot express easement across the top 
of Owens' parcel (however that parcel is described) and Owen consolidated his parcel in December 
2010 that Owen effectively accomplished a servient estate Idaho Code section 55-313 alteration 
of the location of the easement. See attached Reply Brief Exs. B, C, & D. The District Court 
bypassed this issue completely. 
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Here, Owen was "the person or persons owning or controlling the private lands [ and had] 
the right at their own expense to change such access to any other part of the private lands, but such 
change must be made in such a manner as not to obstruct motor vehicle travel, or to otherwise 
injure any person or persons using or interested in such access." LC. § 55-313. Notably, the statute 
does not require Owen to crank up his bulldozer and move a physical road or easement on the 
ground, but only to "change such access to any other part of the private lands," which he did by 
consolidating his parcels. Id. Further, it was also done in a way "not to obstruct motor vehicle 
travel, or to otherwise injure any person or persons [ such as Regan] using or interested in such 
access." Id. In fact, Owen used the existing road on the orphan parcel for the new location of 
Regan's easement. Id. In doing so, Owen moved the motor vehicle access, which was "less than a 
public dedication." Id. 
Owen's Brief alleges in its conclusion "Reagan's constructed a road in the location [ of the 
30-foot express easement] after receiving a summary judgment that [Reagan's] express easement 
was in that location." Owens' Br. at 40. However, Regan only cleared a path in that space prior to 
receiving the injunction to use the orphan parcel roadway until this litigation was settled. A.R. 186, 
190-91. There is certainly no usable road there, and Regan continues to be stymied as to why Owen 
would want a roadway closer to his residence rather than further north on the orphan parcel. 
Regan's argument is not about the overturned reformation of the deed by the Court. 
6) Whether if the previous question regarding relocation by the servient estate 
owner is answered in the affirmative, then whether paragraphs one and three in the 
December 17, 2010 judgment must be vacated and remanded to the trial court to determine 
and then restate the true location of the thirty-foot express easement to confirm whether 
Instrument No. 1137747 controls said easement's location. 
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Regan prays this Court agrees Owen moved his easement by consolidating the orphan 
parcel with his main parcel, and that this Court remand to confirm Owens' relocation. 
7) Prayer and Argument for Award of Regans' Attorney's Fees and Costs. 
Owens' Response Brief does not argue against Regan's claims for an award of costs. 
Owens Br. at 39-40. Therefore, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 40(a) this Court may "as a matter 
of course" award Regans' their costs, and Regans pray it does make that award. I.AR. 40(a). 
Owens' claim their "defense in this appeal is not frivolous." Owens Br. at 40. However, 
Regan has shown in this Reply Brief where Owens defense is frivolous, but since "proceedings at 
the trial level are [in]complete," this Court may choose to leave this issue until the full resolution 
of the case at a later date. Steel Farms, Inc. v. Croft & Reed, Inc., 297 P.3d 222,232, 154 Idaho 
259, 269 (Idaho 2012); citing I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l). Regan prays this Court makes Regans an award 
of attorney's fees and costs in a proportion it deems reflects a proper allocation. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court judgment that Regans' prescriptive easement over the Orphan Parcel was 
extinguished by the Tax Deed conveyance to Kootenai County was in error, because its decision 
failed to account for Idaho Code section 55-603 and the resulting unconstitutional taking. The 
decision did not consider the validity of the tax deed itself. Nor did it consider the constitutional 
due process issues created by the lack of notice to Regans before the issuance of the tax deed. The 
trial court decision did not reflect an accurate interpretation of the phrase "absolute title" in Idaho 
Code section 63-1009. Also, the decision did not consider the impact of Owens' combination of 
the Owen Parcel with the Orphan Parcel in 2010, or the effect it had on the location of the Regans' 
easement pursuant to Idaho Code section 55-313. Finally, Regans should be awarded costs a11d 
attorney's fees, the latter at a later date. 
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MAIL with postage prepaid addressed to: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon, & Weeks, PA 
113 S. Second Ave. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Attorney for Respondents 
Arthur B. Macomber 
Attorney for Appellants Regan 
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Brent Regan and Moura Regan, 
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Supreme Court Case No. 
40848-2013 
District Court 
Case No. CV 2011-2136 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, Clifford T. Hayes, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State 
ofldaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the attached list of exhibits is 
a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being forwarded to the Supreme Court of Appeals. 
I further certify that the following documents will be submitted as exhibits to the 
Record: 
I. Plaintiff's Exhibits: 1 - Photo- Filed 5/31/12 
2, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 - Photo 
15 - Warranty Deed 
16 - Photo 
17 - Warranty Deed 
17, 18, 19 - Photo 
20-Tax Deed 
21- County Deed 
@Record of Survey 
25 - Building Permit 
37 - Tax Paper 
47, 51, 57, 58 - Photo 
I-Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits 
Brent Regan, etal vs. Jeff Owen, etal Supreme Court Docket No. 40848-2013 Page 1 of 87 
2. Defendant's Exhibits: I - Real Estate Contract Filed 5/31/12 
L - Property Survey 
M - Record Survey 




AAA- Property Map 
BBB, CCC, DDD, EEE, GGG, HHH, III, JJJ, KKK, LLL, 
MMM, NNN, 000 - Photo 
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at Kootenai 
County, Idaho this ---'--1_day of_ ...... H-~-· \ ___ , 2013. 
Clifford T. Hayes 
Clerk of the District Court 
2-Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits 
• Brent Regan, eta! vs. Jeff Owen, eta! 
(p, 3 .f 3) 
. Page 2 of 87 Supreme Court Docket No. 40848-2013 
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Id- C) 
·9·1 REQUEST FOR SEGREGATION OR COMBINATION ---. AS-51 
The owner Is responsible for checking with the city/county Planning and Butldlng Departments regarding ap~licable zoning 
and.subdivision regulations for both combining and splitting land parcels. Any action taken through the Assessor's Office 
does not constitute permit approval for other city/county departments. 
,, Se FF~ t\anvt DH)e.<A I (owner), hereby request the following Rarcel(s) be SEGREGATE~ 
For assessment purposes beginning the Assessment Year: GQI / . (please circle a~tlon requ,sted} 
PARCEL: Sot,/O?JW-a,:.. 7/u O SERIAL: 2d:-<2P.to . · 
PARCEL: 5DND?t.p,2L\- 'b{pC>O 
(attach addltlonal pages If needed) 
SERIAL : /'7 & ,;o 
For segregations, please 11st the separate legal descriptions below, or attach Individual Instrument# with desprlption 
references as applicable. If there are buildings or other Improvements assessed to the current parcel, pleasl:i Indicate on 
which descriptions (new parcels) the buildings or Improvements are located: 
C!..!>vV\bir1.e. pi ,21.-7/t,,o ,'tJfo pit 3'-/~3..f;>_(?.o __ .. ~~ J:.;Js·l:t·-:!!- ?--z.9.L/-ogs f'.vy 
. . . . Ccrre.c.:f 1/es·hna 
Please read the following information carefully regarding the combining of parcels for assessment purposes and • 
acknowledge by initialing the app,licable statement(s) and signlng and dating below. 
~- Initial: W-7'\ It is my Intent to combine mull le assessment ot sand tax bllls Into as n le ssessrne t ~ notice-™xbill, and I understand that th)s action WIii not l\lffecl U,~_yaluation basis for my property • 
. };,- Initial: : It Is my Intent to combine a·buildable p~~~-el bf land ~th other non:.t,yUdable parcel(s) of land 
for both valuation and assessment notice and lax billing purpo·ses, Into a single assessment notice. I have 
attached a "determination of non-buildability" for each app!lcable parcel, from the appropriate City or County 
Planning or Building Department, or the Panhandle Health District. 
NON-SUBDIVIDED PARCELS 
)>- l{litial . It Is my Intent to combine multiple bulldable parcels ·of land Into a single bulldable parcel 
for both valuation and assessment notice/tax bllling purpos~. I have attached a copy of a recorded deed that 
describes the new boundary of the single buffdable parcel with added language expressing the g'13n!ors Intent 
to merge ancl consolidate said parcels Into a single parcel for all purposes. (Please ask for example Quitclaim 
Deed) · 
SUBDIVIDED PARCELS , 
} . Initial Combining multlple bu!ldable lots· 1nto a single build able parcel for valuation purposes 
requires _docurrientation from the appropriate City or County Planning Department stating that the,combined 
lots constitute a single bulldable parcel. 
ATTENTJON 
~ itial lJ f, I understand that for any parcels lo be comb.ined Into one ass~ssment notice/tax bill, current 
~ars' ~ paid fn full. This includes any delinquencies and 2"° half payments still owing. Non-
p yment of !axe wil :esult In- denial of this application for combination. · · 
*****+****'*************** ~*'Hrll**'***"*****'*'*'****~******""******,1,*******ri*"*"*H**"!°**H***W********°***"A'***********+*t'********'************** 
ASSESSOR'S OFFICE USE ONLY: , · 1 / · ...•. 
. Taxes Delinquent: XNO DYES for assessment years: d'Q(D .,';Jr: If INIT:~. 
CommooIB, ~ 
· ~ ~+fuhed- 11"2C./eof rw,,. 
I I ·,a-
T£:nC8"ed Informt101• t:J;nt Ile: • 
Total T E!llired: 
B.,, (.nm Paid: 
00,/, J?FF D 
3233 S ID.Nil RD 
CCELR D /IDE 1D ffBI q 
STATEOFIDAHO } 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI SS. 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A TRUE 
COPY OF THE RECORD ON FILE IN THE KOOTENAI 
COUNTY ASSESSOR'S OFFICE. 
s-~1-f;l.0r2..sv ~lf.5().jt 
DATE DEPUTY 
Scott L. Poorman, ISB #4701 
SCOTT L. POORMAN, P.C. 
8884 North Government Way, Suite E 
Post Office Box 2871 
Hayden, ID 83835 
Telephone: (208) 772-6800 
Facsimile: (208) 772-6811 
Attorney for plaintiffs 
2012 AUG 14 PM 4: 39 
CLERK DIS TRIG T COURT 
DEPIHY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
BRENT REGAN and MOURA REGAN, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
JEFF D. OWEN and KAREN A. OWEN, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
Case No. CV 11-2136 
Affidavit of Scott L. Poorman in 
Support of Plaintiffs' Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
SCOTT L. POORMAN, being first duly sworn under oath, testifies as follows: 
1. I am the attorney for the plaintiffs in this case. I am over the age of 18 years, I make this 
affidavit voluntarily and I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this Affidavit 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a certified copy of Kootenai County Instrument No. 
1486932 recorded on April 18, 1997. 
Affidavit of Scott L. Poorman in Support of Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment Page- t, ,. Cl { ' o.f 8 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a ce1tified copy of Kootenai County Instrument No. 
2294085000 recorded on December 9, 2010. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is a certified copy of a Request for Segregation or 
Combination filed by Jeff and Karen Owen v.~th the Kootenai County ,A~ssessor's office on or 
about December 9, 2010. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a certified copy of a Record of Survey recorded in Book 
1 of Surveys, Page 132, records of Kootenai County, Idaho. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit 5 is a true and correct copy of the defendants' title insurance 
commitment dated January 17, 2003. 
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit 6 is a true and correct copy of the defendants' title insurance 
policy dated June 5, 2003. 
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit 7 is a certified copy of the Kootenai County Assessor's 
records related to the "orphan" parcel number 50N03W-27-7160. 
DATED this/f_ day of August 2012. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / Lj day of August, 2012. 
~bc0 J: &4>@d 
Notary for the State of Idaho 
Commission Expires: .J', ;2.C>. ) g 
Affidavit of Scott L. Poorman in Support of Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment Page - 2 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
BRENT REGAN and MOURA REGAN, 




JEFF D. OWEN and KAREN A. OWEN, 
















ORDER GRANTil'>JG IN PART AND 
DENYING IN PART APPELLANTS' 
SECOND MOTION TO AUGMENT 
THE RECORD 
Supreme Court Docket No. 40848-2013 
Kootenai County No. 2011-2136 
APPELLANTS' SECOND MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD was filed by counsel 
for Appellants on October 7, 2013. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that APPELLANTS' SECOND MOTION TO AUGMENT THE 
RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED in part, and the augmentation record shall include the 
documents listed below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and Notice of Hearing, file-stamped 
September I, 2011; 
2. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
file-stamped September 1, 2011; 
3. Affidavit of Brent Regan in Support of Plaintiffs' motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
with attachments, file-stamped September 1, 2011; 
4. Affidavit of Scott L. Poorman in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, file-stamped September 1, 2013; 
5. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, file-stamped 
September 15, 2011; 
6. Affidavit of Weeks in Response to Plaintiffs' Motion· for Summary Judgment, with 
attachments, file-stamped October 27, 2011; 
7. Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Motion for Contempt and Notice of 
Hearing, file-stamped October 27, 2011; 
8. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Contempt, 
file-stamped October 27, 2013; 
9. Affidavit of Jonathon Verkist in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
'--n'---'-Jl"'--GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPELLANTS' SECOND MOTION 
AUGMENT THE RECORD - Docket No. 40848-201 
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and Contempt, file-stamped October 27, 2011; 
10. Affidavit of Scott Poorman in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
and Contempt, with attachments, file-stamped October 27, 2011; 
11. Affidavit of Brent Regan in Support of motion for Preliminary Injunction and Contempt, 
with attachments, file-stamped October 27, 2013; 
12. Motion for Enlargement of Time to File Objection to Preliminary Injunction, file-stamped 
November 3, 2011; 
13. Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, file-stamped 
November 4, 2011; 
14. Affidavit of Jeff D. Owen in Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 
with attachments, file-stamped November 4, 2011; 
15. Affidavit of Karen Owen in Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 
file-stamped November 4, 2011; 
16. Affidavit of Weeks in Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, with 
attachments, file-stamped November 4, 2011; 
upplemental Affidavit of Scott Poorman in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction and Contempt, with attachments, file-stamped December 7, 2011; 
18. Supplemental Affidavit of Brent Regan in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
and Contempt, with attachments, file-stamped December 7, 2011; 
19. Plaintiffs' Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Contempt, 
file-stamped December 7, 2011; 
20. Affidavit of Bruce Anderson, Kootenai County Surveyor, with attachments, file-stamped 
December 8, 2011; 
21. Notice of Election to Cross Examine the Adverse Party's Affiants, file-stamped 
December 13, 2011; 
22. Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend Pleadings to Add a Counterclaim for Trespass, 
with attachment, file-stamped March 16, 2012; 
23. Defendants' Motion for Relief from Uniform Pretrial Order, file-stamped March 16, 
2012; 
24. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, file-stamped March 28, 2012; 
25. Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, file-stamped 
March 28, 2012; 
26. Affidavit of Weeks in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, with 
attachments, file-stamped March 28, 2012; 
27. Affidavit of David Johnson in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
file-stamped March 28, 2012; 
28. Motion in Limine to Preclude Witnesses from Testifying, file-stamped May 14, 2012; 
29. Affidavit of Weeks in Support of Motion in Limine to Preclude Witnesses from 
Testifying, with attachments, file-stamped May 14, 2012; 
30. Affidavit of Scott Poorman in Support of Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion in 
Limine, file-stamped May 16, 2012; 
31. Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief from Pre-trial Order to Serve Supplemental Discovery and 
Motion to Shorten Time, file-stamped May 16, 2012; 
32. Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion in Limine, file-stamped May 16, 2012; 
33. Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine to Preclude Witnesses from 
Testifying, with attachment, file-stamped May 22, 2012; 
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. Notice of Election to Cross Examine the Adverse Party's Affiants and to Produce 
Testimony, file-stamped May 30, 2012; 
35. Order on Motions, file-stamped June 20, 2012; 
Affidavit of Scott L. Poorman in Support of Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment, with attachments, file-stamped August 14, 2012; 
37. Affidavit of Harold D. Smart in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
with attachments, file-stamped August 14, 2012; 
38. Affidavit of Thomas R. Collins in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
with attachments, file-stam.ped August 14, 2012; 
39. Affidavit of David English in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
with attachments, file-stamped August 14, 2012; 
40. Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Summary Judgment, file-stamped 
August 1.4, 2012; 
41. Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Summary Judgment and Notice of Hearing, file-stamped 
August 14, 2012; 
42. Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend Affirmative Defenses, file-stamped August 16, 
2012; 
43. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment, file-stamped August 30, 2012; 
44. Affidavit of Weeks in Response to Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Summary Judgment, 
with attachments, file-stamped August 30, 2012; 
45. Affidavit of Jeff D. Owen in Support of Defendants' Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment, file-stamped September 4, 2012; 
46. Affidavit of Susan P. Weeks in Support of Defendants' Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment, with attachments, file-stamped September 4, 2012; 
47. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment, 
file-stamped September 4, 2012; 
48. Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment, file-stamped September 5, 2012; 
49. Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment, 
file-stamped September 18, 2012; 
50. Affidavit of Harvey Richman in Opposition to Defendants' Second Summary Judgment 
Motion, with attachments, file-stamped September 18, 2012; 
51. Affidavit of Brent Regan in Opposition to Defendants' Second Summary Judgment 
Motion, with attachments, file-stamped September 18, 2012; 
52. Affidavit of Ben Tarbutton in Opposition to Defendants' Second Summary Judgment 
Motion, with attachment, file-stamped September 18, 2012; 
53. Affidavit of Scott Poorman in Opposition to Defendants' Second Summary Judgment 
Motion, with attachments, file-stamped September 18, 2012; 
54. Motion for Enlargement of Time to File Defendants' Reply in Support of Second Motion 
for Summary Judgment, file-stamped September 25, 2012; 
55. Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment, 
file-stamped September 27, 2012; 
56. Stipulation for Dismissal of Contempt Claims, file-stamped January 22, 2013; and 
57. Order Dismissing Motions for Contempt and Releasing Cash Deposit, file-stamped 
February 7, 2013. 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPELLANTS' SECOND MOTION 
TO AUGMENT THE RECORD- Docket No. 40848-2013 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that APPELLANTS' SECOND MOTION TO AUGMENT 
THE RECORD be, and hereby is, DENIED in part, without prejudice, as to the documents listed 
below as they do not bear the file stamp of the district court as required by IAR 30(a). 
1. Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion for Relief from Pretrial Order, dated March 
26,2012;and 
2. Plaintiffs' Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Summary Judgment, 
dated September 6, 2012. 
DATED this ~ay of October, 2013. 
For the Supreme Court 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
cc: Counsel of Record 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPELLANTS' SECOND MOTION 
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STATE OF IOAHO t 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI( SS 
f'ILEO: 
Scott L. Poorman, ISB #4701 
SCOTT L. POORMAN, P.C. 
2011 DEC -7 PM 2: Sf 
CLERK OISTRICT COURT 
8884 North Government Way, Suite E 
Post Office Box 2871 
Hayden, ID 83835 
Telephone: (208) 772-6800 
Facsimile; (208) 772-6811 
Attorney for plaintiffs 
OEPHTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
BRENT REGAN and MOURA REGAN, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
JEFF D. OWEN and KAREN A. OWEN, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
Case No. CV 11-2136 
Supplemental Affidavit of Scott 
Poorman in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction and Contempt 
SCOTT L. POORMAN, being first duly sworn under oath, testifies as follows: 
1. I am the attorney of record for the above-named plaintiffs. I make this affidavit 
voluntarily and I am competent to testify to the facts stated herein based upon my personal 
knowledge. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a ce1iified copy of the Property Survey recorded on 
June 26, 1979 in Book 1 of Surveys, Page 186, records of Kootenai County, Idaho 
Supplemental Affidavit of Scott L. Poorman in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction and Contempt Pa'ge • 1 
269 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit "D" is a ce1tified copy of the Record of Survey recorded on 
October 27, 1986 in Book 5 of Surveys, Page 30, records of Kootenai County, Idaho. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit "E" is a certified copy of the Record of Survey recorded on 
June 25, 1997 in Book 19 of Surveys, Page 23, records of Kootenai County, Idaho. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit "F" is a true and correct copy of the CUI1'ent Kootenai county 
Assessor's Map for Section 34, Township 50 North, Range 3 West, Boise Meridian, and showing 
the combination of the OWEN Parcel and the orphan parcel. 
DATED this 1 day of December, 2011. 
f'J-rh day of December, 2011. 
Notary for the itai;; ofldah 
Commission Expires: c) I 0UL-'( Jo{ Lf 
Certificate of Delivery 
I hereby certify that on the .2 day of December, 2011, a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Supplemental Affidavit of Scott L. Poorman in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction and Contempt was delivered as follows: 
U U.S. mail postage paid 
D fax transmission 
'P( hand delivery 
SusanP. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks, PA 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814-2971 
Fax: 664-1648 
upplemental Affidavit of Scott L. Poorman in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for 
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All that portion of the Northwest quarter of Section 34, Township 50 . 
North, Range 3 W.B.M., Kootenai County, State of Idaho, more 
particularly described as follows: 
Colillllencing at the Northeast corner of the North'!"est ·quarter of ~aid 
Section 34, thence South 00°25'26" West along the East line of the 
Northwest quarter, a distance of 680.98 feet to a point distant , 
North 00°25'26" East 1955.43 feet from the southeast corner of the 
Northwest quarter of said Section 34, thence North 89°22'06u West a 
distance of ·660. 00 feet to the True· Point of Beginning of this 
·description; thence continue North 89°22'06u West, a distance of 
660.00 feet; then~e North 00°25'26" East a distance of 680.00 feet 
more or less to a point on the North line of said Northwest quarter; 
thence ,South 89° 07' 48" East along the North line of s.aid Northwest 
quarter, a distance of 660.00 feet more or less to a p9int of 
intersection with a line drawn North 00°25'26" East from the point 
of beginning; thence South 00°25'26" West, a distance of 680.00 more 
or less to the Point of Beginning. 
TOGETHER WITH: 
That certain part of South hal£ of Southwest quarter of Section 27, 
Township 50 North, Range 3 West, Boise Meridian, Koote·nai County, 
Idaho, lying South of a parcel of land as.described in a Warranty 
Deed record~d March 24, 1988 as Instrument No .. 1112028, records of 
Kootenai County, Idaho, and also lying South of a parcel of land 
described in a Warranty Deed recorded June 5, 1989 as Instrument 
No. 1150484, records of Kootenai County, Idaho and lying East of a 
parcel of land described in a Warranty Deed recorded April 30, 1999 
as Instrument No. 1586858, records of Kootenai County, Idaho. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM that parcel of land as described in a Warranty 
Deed recorded December 28, 1988 as Instrument No. 1137749, records 
of Kootenai County, Idaho. · 
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